Although the second book of Aristotle's Politics distinguishes between proposed and existing constitutions, careful examination of the criteria which Aristotle uses to judge Plato's Republic and the Spartan constitution blurs the relevance of such a division. Aristotle uses the same four criteria to evaluate both constitutions and scholars have failed to appreciate that he uses the same criteria to organize his presentation of many of the arguments in Politics 2. By contrast, Aristotle discounts the criteria of stability in Politics 2. Aristotle's selective use of criteria calls into question the claim that his best regime can serve as a regulative ideal for judging existing constitutions.
Introduction
Aristotle's examination of superlative politeiai or "constitutions" in Politics 2 at first glance sets in opposition those constitutions "used in cities that are said to be well governed", namely Sparta, Crete, and Carthage, and those which have only been articulated in speech, namely the constitutions described by Plato's Socrates, Phaleas of Chalcedon, and the city-planner Hippodamus of Miletus.1 Whereas the former seem to be exercises in what works best in practice, the latter seem to be theoretical or even utopian exercises.2 Whereas statesmen or lawgivers such as Lycurgus and Minos are responsible for the first class of constitutions, laypersons uninvolved in actual politics are the authors of the theoretical constitutions which Aristotle examines (2.7.1266a31-34, 2.12.1273b27-32). Although Aristotle notes at the outset of Politics 2 that he examines both kinds of constitutions because his aim is to study which political community is best "for those able to live especially in accord with one's prayers" (2.1.1260b28-29), Politics 2 seems to be a two-part work.
Although clearly Politics 2 distinguishes between constitutions in use and those merely proposed in speech, Aristotle nonetheless uses the same criteria for evaluating both kinds of constitutions. When judging Plato's Republic, Aristotle explicitly asks whether the results of the community of women, children, and property are better than the "present" (nun) arrangements, using actual practices as a criterion for judging a theoretical reform (2.1.1261a8-9). Aristotle begins his analysis of the Spartan constitution by announcing that it (and other constitutions) can be judged both in comparison to an external norm, namely what is the best arrangement, and with respect to an internal norm, namely what is the fit between a constitution's laws and its fundamental principle or "hypothesis" (2.9.1269b30-34). Finally, in both his examinations of the Republic and the Spartan Constitution, Aristotle judges the validity of their respective "hy potheses." All four of these criteria are at work in evaluating both existing and theoretical constitutions. Although scholars have noticed several of the criteria in use in different parts of Politics 2, none seem to recognize the existence of all four criteria or appreciate their place in the organization of arguments within Politics 2.1-5 and 2.9.3 Such oversight is problematic because Aristotle himself explicitly Rubin 2012 argues that the practically best constitutions are meant to eclipse the "utopian" constitutions discussed in Politics 2. An earlier generation of scholars, following Jaeger 1948, took such reasoning a step further and argued that Aristotle's account of the best regime was simply a remnant of a youthful flirtation with Platonic idealism, something he rejected in his maturity. Jaeger's claim for a disunited Politics has been amply refuted by Lord 1981 , Rowe 1991 , and Pellegrin 1996 . 3 Saunders 1995, 105 f., 149, and Simpson 1998, 112 , note that what I call the internal and external criteria are used throughout Politics 2, although neither views them alongside the actual practice criterion (Saunders combines the external and fundamental principle criteria). Mayhew 1997, 59 and 95, notes the use of "ends" and "means" criteria in Politics 2.2-5, but does not remark on their use elsewhere in Politics 2 (or their formal articulation in Pol 2.9). De Laix 1974, 21 f., by contrast, takes the external and internal criteria to refer only to historical and current Spartan institutions without appreciating their application to other constitutions in Politics 2. Although numerous commentators acknowledge the actual practice and fundamental principle criteria in the critique of the Republic (see, for instance, Deslauriers 2013, 122-131; Kraut 2002, 310-314 and 352 f.; Miller 1995, 156 f.; Simpson 1998, 100-103; Stalley 1991, 187 f. and 195 f.) , I am unaware of identifies these criteria and uses them to organize his criticisms of the Republic and the Spartan constitution. Articulating Aristotle's evaluative criteria is thus useful for clarifying and understanding properly the various arguments he makes in Politics 2. 4 Articulating Aristotle's evaluative criteria also elucidates the status of the constitution which Aristotle describes in the last two books of the Politics, namely that constitution which is best in accord with one's prayers.5 As noted above, Politics 2 begins by announcing that the purpose of its investigation -both in the case of existing and proposed constitutions -is to determine what is best for all people able to live most in accord with one's prayers (2.1.1260b27-28). Politics 2 and Politics 7-8 are quite tightly linked -almost every chapter in the latter text makes reference to discussions in the former text.6 More surprising is that evaluative criteria Aristotle uses outside Politics 2 and 7-8, for instance evaluating the stability of a constitution, are almost entirely absent from Politics 2 (a claim I will defend in my conclusion). That Aristotle both judges existing and proposed best constitutions on the basis of the same criteria and devalues their evaluation on the basis of the criterion of stability results in a paradox. Although Aristotle lessens the gap between existing and proposed constitutions, he broadens the gap between ideal and non-ideal constitutions. Put less paradoxically, Ar isany commentator who has synoptically comprehended their incorporation with the internal and external criteria used throughout Politics 2. Appreciation of Aristotle's use of criteria throughout Politics 2 is rare because scholarship usually focuses on Aristotle's critique of an individual constitution in Pol 2 (e. g., that of Plato, or that of Hippodamus, or that of Sparta). 4 Simpson 1991, shows that understanding the order of Aristotle's textual divisions is crucial for understanding his arguments in the case of Politics 2.2-4; I extend his insight to Pol 2.1, 2.5, and 2.9. 5 For Aristotle's characterization of that constitution as the aristê politeia, see Pol 7. 1.1323a14, 7.4.1325b37 and 7.13.1332a4 ; for that of a city in accord with one's prayers or highest hopes, see also Pol 4. 4.1325b37, 7.10.1330a26-27 and 7.11.1330a37. Kraut 2002 notes that Aristotle's repeated use of the term translated as "prayer" (euchê) indicates that he "brackets questions of likelihood […] [and] tells his audience: this city, the best we can hope for, is possible; but nothing further need be said about how one should go about establishing it" (192 n. 1). As Alexander 2000 and Bates 2003 show, identifying Aristotle's "best constitution" is complicated because he uses the term to describe several different constitutions. By "best constitution," I will only be concerned with the constitution discussed in Politics 7-8. Although the last two books of Aristotle's Politics present a number of textual problems -including their incompleteness, unfulfilled forward references, and the fragmentary nature of Politics 8.7 -the division of the text into two "books" (i. e. Politics 7 and 8) is arbitrary and interrupts a clear division of analysis (articulated most clearly at 7.4.1325b33-26a4, 7.13.1331b23-32b10 and 8.2.1337a32-37b2) . Thus, I refer to Politics 7-8 as a unified text throughout my paper. 6 Lockwood 2015, 78-82 , demonstrates the close textual connections between Politics 2 and 7-8. totle uses the same criteria to evaluate both existing and proposed constitutions insofar as they are being judged as best. At the same time, Aristotle diminishes the relevance of criteria such as institutional stability for the evaluation of superlatively good constitutions. Such a mixed use of evaluative criteria in Politics 2 calls into question the claim that he also uses the account of the best regime of Politics 7-8 as primarily a regulative ideal or a standard by means of which to judge all other constitutions.7 The best regime must be superlatively good regardless of whether it exists actually or only in someone's political imagination; but it does not follow that therefore such a constitution gives guidance about reforming non-superlative constitutions.
My paper works through four parts. In part 2, I explain the four different criteria Aristotle uses to evaluate constitutions and their institutions in Politics 2. In parts 3 and 4 of my paper, I show that Aristotle uses these criteria to evaluate proposed and existing constitutions and how these criteria provide the overall analytical structure for his critiques of the Republic and the constitution of Sparta. Finally, in the conclusion of my paper I explore why Aristotle places less emphasis on a criterion like constitutional stability in Politics 2 and 7-8.
Evaluative Criteria in Politics 2
At the beginning of both the critique of the Republic and that of the Spartan constitution, Aristotle explicitly identifies evaluative criteria. In the first case, Aristotle launches his selective investigation of the Republic by asking:
Is it better for a city-state that is to be well managed to share everything possible? Or is it better to share some things but not others? For the citizens could share children, women, and property with one another, as in Plato's Republic. For Socrates claims there that children, women, and property should be communal. So is what we have now better, or what accords with the law described in the Republic? (2.1.1261a1-9) 7 Miller 1995, 252, for instance claims that Aristotle's best constitution "though possible in principle, was unattainable in practice on Aristotle 's view." Miller 2009, 43, elaborates further: for the Aristotelian statesman "the best constitution serves as a regulative ideal. This approach may be described as approximist: Practical politics should aim at reforming existing systems so that they approximate this ideal as closely as is feasible" (cf. Rowe 1991, 59-61) . By contrast, Ober 1998, 291-295 and 339-351 , argues that Aristotle's city of one's prayers, however difficult to obtain, was indeed a blue-print for colonists targeting Asia Minor in the 330s following Macedonian expansion; see also Samaras 2007 and Kraut 2002, 192-195. Although Aristotle's criticisms of the Republic incorporate other evaluative criteria, a standard criterion he uses is to ask whether the institutional change found in a constitution is superior to "present day" institutions -what I will call the "actual practice" criterion. As Aristotle will show at length in Politics 2.5, among the reasons for rejecting Socrates' proposal for communal property is that Socrates' arrangement is inferior to the "present practice" (nun tropon [1263a2, a22, a30-31] ) already established in Sparta and Crete, namely their communal messes which combine private ownership of property with its communal use.8
Although it seems commonsensical to evaluate the "theoretical" merits of an innovative constitutional reform against existing institutions, Aristotle's defense of the actual as a criterion is not without philosophical commitments. Aristotle suggests that the innovations of sharing children and women or communal messes for women are without precedent (2.7.1266a36-39) and that is a prima facie problem, as "we should consider the immense period of time and the many years during which it would not have gone unnoticed if these measure were any good. For practically speaking all things have been discovered, although some have not been collected, and others are known about but not used" (2.5.1264a1-5).9 Given Aristotle's understanding of the cyclical nature of history, almost everything which is possible is in some sense previously actual and thus all innovative political reform needs to be evaluated against existing (even if historically existing) institutions.10
In the second case, at the beginning of his examination of the Spartan constitution, Aristotle articulates two more evaluative criteria. He writes:
8 Aristotle begins Politics 2 by noting that one of the reasons for investigating previous constitutions is "in order to avoid giving the impression that our search for something different from them results from a desire to be clever (sophizesthai)" (2.1.1260b33-34). In Lockwood 2015 I argue that Aristotle's explicit concern about criticizing previous constitutions shows a sensitivity to the relationship between political innovation and the normative force of laws. Aristotle's application of what I call the "actual practice" criterion reflects such a concern: what is actual or existing has a normative force even in the case that it is defective. 9 Aristotle's discussion of Hippodamos' constitution problematizes the issue of innovation in political theorizing both at the level of new discoveries and at the level of implementing changes that may undermine laws (even though those changes are better than existing institutions); see further 2.8.1268b22-1269a28; cf. 7.10.1329b30 and 7.11.1331a1. 10 Commentators note that Aristotle's claim is grounded in his belief in the eternality of the human species and the cyclical development and restoration of human civilization. See, for instance, Mete 352b16-17, GA 731b24-732a3, 742b17-743a1 and DA 415a25-b7. It is striking that a rare exception to his claim about the rarity of truly novel innovation concerns philosophical responses to the technological advances of siege warfare in Aristotle's own time (7.11.1331a1-18).
There are two things to investigate about the constitution of Sparta, of Crete, and pretty much the other constitutions also. First, is there anything legislated in it that is fine or unfine as compared with the best organization (pros tên aristên nenomothetêtai taxin)? Second, is there anything legislated in it that is contrary to the fundamental principle or manner (pros tên hupothesin kai ton tropon hupenantiôs tês prokeimenês autois politeias) of its constitution? (2.9.1269a29-34)
The passage explicitly articulates two criteria and implies a third. The first criterion -what I will call the "external criterion" -invokes an evaluative comparison with the best organization. At numerous places in Politics 2, Aristotle uses as a standard of evaluation a constitution which maximizes the happiness of its citizens. Thus, for instance, he will criticize Socrates' constitution in the Republic because it fails to account for the happiness of all its members, something he incorporates into his best constitution (2.5.1264b16-24; cf. 7.9.1329a21-26) . Such a standard is not impossibly high -Aristotle makes explicit that it must be possible (2.6.1265a17-18) -nonetheless, it is a yardstick appropriate to measure any candidate for the best constitution.11
The second explicit criterion articulated at the beginning of 2.9 -what I will call the "internal criterion" -concerns the relationship or "fit" between the laws, education, and institutions of a constitution and its "fundamental principle" (hypothesis) or the "intent" (proairesis) of its lawgiver.12 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle likens the principle of action -the reason for the sake of which one acts (to hou heneka) -to hypotheses in mathematics (EN 7.8.1151a17 ). What Aristotle seems to have in mind by such a "hypothesis" or "underlying principle" is the most basic or important determination of value either in a specific constitution or in a class of constitutions.13 For instance, in Politics 2 Aristotle claims that 11 As I discuss in the conclusion, what Aristotle identifies here with the "best organization" is neither identical with the regime described in Pol 7-8, nor a regulative ideal for non-ideal constitutions. 12 When discussing existing constitutions, Aristotle refers to the "choice" (proairesis) of the lawgiver or the "aim" (boulêma [2.9.1270b32]) of the constitution in a way that is equivalent to his use of the term hypothesis. See 2.9.1269b13-14 and 1271a32 as well as 2.12.1274a12. 13 Aristotle uses the term hypothesis in at least two distinct senses in the Politics. As Bonitz, Index, points out, the term can mean "with qualification" or "based on a supposition" in opposition to what is without qualification or haplôs (for instance, children are citizens in a "hypothetical" sense, viz. they are potentially citizens [3.5.1278a5]; a good person can be "hypothetically" good, namely good relative to his or her constitution [4.7.1293b4]); but it can also mean that which is in some sense fundamental, which is how Aristotle uses the term as an evaluative criterion, namely as what is the most fundamental value according to the organization of the constitution (796b41-797a60). When Politics 4.1 talks about what sort of constitution is best ex hypotheseôs (1288b28), namely in the qualified sense that one can ask what is good for Socrates' hypothesis in the Republic is that it is best for a state to be as unified as possible (2.2.1261a13-15; cf. 2.5.1263b29-31) and that Sparta's hypothesis was the supremacy of military virtue (or the domination [kratein] for the sake of which military virtue aims).14 Elsewhere in the Politics Aristotle identifies freedom as the hypothesis of a democratic constitution (6.2.1317a40) and power as that of a tyrannical constitution (5.11.1314a28, a38).
The "internal criterion" is "relativistic" in the following sense: it is not concerned with the objective well-being of a constitution, for instance, whether it is a just or well-organized constitution or one productive of its citizens' well-being. Rather, such a criterion captures whether a constitution has an internal consistency between its hypothesis and various institutions and offices. An oligarchy with inclusive jury service would be judged poorly according to this criterion as would a democratic constitution that imposed property qualifications for voting. Although the "internal criteria" is articulated in the discussion of the Spartan constitution, Aristotle invokes it in Pol 2.3, for instance, when he claims that Socrates' proposal brings about the opposite of what he intended.
Aristotle's discussion of the fit between institutions and a constitution's hypothesis implies an additional criterion that Aristotle will appeal to occasionally even if he does not articulate it formally, namely the rightness of a constitution's hypothesis or what I will call the "fundamental value" criterion. Such a criterion overlaps with an aspect of the external criteria -namely, the ways in which a constitution's hypothesis falls short of that of the best constitution. But as I will examine below in section 2, when Aristotle criticizes the Socratic hypothesis about the unity of the city, he does so by pointing out how such a hypothesis is logically inconsistent with the sufficiency of a polis.15 Although the fundamental value criterion is the least distinct of the four criteria, there are passages in any constitution, even a deviant one, Aristotle makes use of the term hypothesis as "in a qualified sense." But when Aristotle claims that unity is the hypothesis of Socrates' proposals in the Republic or that freedom is the hypothesis of democratic constitutions, he is using the term in the second sense, namely specifying the underlying value of a specific constitution. Saunders 1995, 104-106 and 149, appears to blur the distinction between these two different senses of Aristotle's use of hypothesis. Compare Miller 1995, 156-159, which elucidates the "fundamental" sense of hypothesis but loses sight of the "qualified" sense of the term. 14 See Pol 2.9.1271a41 with Laws 742d. In Politics 7-8 Aristotle will describe such a hypothesis as both the "horos" or "skopos," namely, the "aim" of the constitution (7.2.1324b4, 7.15.1334a12) and its telos or "end" (7.2.1325a7, 7.14.1333b7, 7.15.1334a11-36). 15 I am grateful to a referee for the journal for noting that there is significant latitude in the application of this criterion, which picks out the hypothesis of any constitution (which may not even be explicit) and then evaluates its cogency. But the criterion does not specify a hypothesis by means of which all other hypotheses can be judged. Aristotle's critique of the Socratic which it is clearly applied in judging a constitution (including when Aristotle criti cizes the Socratic hypothesis about the unity of a polis and when he criticizes the Spartan hypothesis of domination).16
In sum, Politics 2 explicitly articulates three criteria for judging constitutions and implies a fourth. The ways in which the institutions of a constitution compare to existing practices and the best organization of a constitution are the basis for the first two criteria; the fit between a constitution's hypothesis and institutions and the correctness of its hypothesis are the basis for the remaining two. Although Aristotle introduces his four criteria in different places in Politics 2, in practice he clearly makes use of all four throughout his criticisms of both proposed and existing constitutions.17 Let me elucidate Aristotle's use of these criteria in his judgments of the Republic and Spartan constitution.
Criteria in the Critique of the Republic (Politics 2.1-5)
Aristotle's examination of the Republic in Politics 2.1-5 is organized around four questions, each of which applies one of his four criteria.18 First, Politics 2.1 asks whether the communal policies of the Republic are better than present practice hypothesis is not based, for instance, on the hypothesis of his own best constitution (although his critique of the Spartan hypothesis is so based). 16 Although Politics 2.9 notes that the Spartan hypothesis, which elevates martial virtue above all else, is worthy of criticism (1271a41-b9), Aristotle's extended reflection on the proper aim of the best constitution is juxtaposed with a sustained criticism of the hypothesis of the Spartan constitution (7.14.1333b5-1334a10, 7.15.1334a39-34b5). Lockwood forthcoming examines those criticisms. 17 All four criteria are invoked throughout Politics 2, although I am only focusing on 2.1-5 (the critique of the Republic) and 2.9 (the critique of Sparta). 18 Gallagher 2011 argues that Aristotle's critique of Plato's Republic is peiristic or based on internal inconsistencies in Socrates' account. For instance, Gallagher takes Aristotle to be pointing out that Socrates' claim that the city is a multitude of different parts is inconsistent with his hypothesis on the unity of the city. Although nothing in my thesis precludes Aristotle from identifying inconsistencies in the Republic (and the internal criterion is a measure of such inconsistencies), Gallagher appears unaware of the explicit articulation of the internal criterion in Politics 2.9. Gallagher's claim is at best limited to Aristotle's application of the internal criterion. There is no place in his "peiristic account" for Aristotle's criticisms based on the other three criteria.
Nor is it clear how Gallagher's claim applies to the other critiques in Politics 2. For instance, does Aristotle treat only the Republic peiristically, or does he also treat the Laws and other proposed constitutions in that fashion?
(2.1.1261a8-9), and then Politics 2.5 argues that the "present fashion" (nun tropon [2.5.1263a2, a22, a30-31]) practiced in Crete and Sparta, which mixes private ownership with communal use, is better than Socrates' proposal (2.5.1263a27-30). Private ownership of property mixed with its communal use achieves the unifying effect which Socrates sought while avoiding all the difficulties of communal ownership. From the perspective of the actual practice criterion, as Aristotle notes, what is already in existence as an actual practice is thus not impossible (2.5.1263a31-32) and in the case of the public messes, has an historical record of use going back centuries, indeed long before they arose in Crete under the reign of Minos (7.10.1329b5-23).
If Politics 2.1 and 2.5 are organized to address the "actual practice" criteria, the chapters in Politics 2.2-4 are organized to address primarily the three different other criteria I have articulated. At the beginning of his critique of the Republic in Politics 2, Aristotle states:
That women should be common to all raises many other difficulties. In particular (1) it is not evident from Socrates' arguments the reason why (di' hên aitian) he thinks this legislation is needed. (2) Besides, the end (telos) he says the city-state should have is impossible, as in fact described. (3) Yet nothing has been settled about how one ought to determine the end -I am talking about that it is best for a city-state to be as far as possible all one unit; for that is the hypothesis Socrates adopts. (2.2.1261a10-16, enumerations added)19
As commentators generally acknowledge, the three different problems Aristotle identifies are taken up (in reverse order) in Politics 2.2-5.20 Proceeding in reverse order: Politics 2.2 takes up the third problem by considering the viability of Socrates' hypothesis or fundamental principle, namely that it is best for a polis to be as unified as possible (2.2.1261a15-16). Aristotle's critique is an application of the fundamental value criterion in which he examines the correctness of the hypothesis which underlies Socrates' proposed constitution. Aristotle's arguments that 19 Historically, 1261a10-16 has been punctuated so as to take criticisms (2) and (3) to be united (see, for instance, Newman 1882-1902, 2 and 229); but Simpson 1991, 100-103, persuasively argues both for the text as I have translated it and that it lays out the structure of Aristotle's analysis in Pol 2.2-4. 20 See Mayhew 1997, 6-8, 13, 59; Saunders 1995, 107 f.; Simpson 1998, 74; Susemihl and Hicks 1894, 216 . As is often the case, Aristotle articulates several problems and then addresses them in reverse order. Thus, Pol 2.1 first asks how Socrates' proposal compares with actual practice, which Aristotle answers in Pol 2.5. Using the enumeration in my translation in the text, the beginning of Pol 2.2 poses questions about how Socrates' proposal compares with respect to (1) the external criterion, which is applied in Pol 2.4, (2) the internal criterion, which is applied in Pol 2.3, and (3) the fundamental principle criterion, which is applied in Pol 2.2. unity is inversely proportionate to self-sufficiency and that Socrates' hypothesis would actually destroy the city (2.2.1261a15-23) show that Socrates' proposed constitution -or more precisely, its fundamental hypothesis -is deeply problematic, independent of institutional fit or comparisons with the best constitution. To claim that a polis should be as unified as possible is simply incorrect and mistakes the unity of a polis for the unity of a human being.
The second problem -that the telos which Socrates proposes is impossible according to the specifications which he describes -is an application of what I have called the internal criterion. Politics 2.3 begins by explicitly conceding that even if it is best for a community to be as much of a unity as possible, Socrates' proposal of communal property will not bring about that end, as communal property leads to the neglect of property and the community of women and children leads to the dilution of bonds between fellow citizens (as Aristotle puts it wryly, "it is better to have a cousin of one's own than a son in the way Socrates describes" [2.3.1262a13-14]). The central criticisms of Politics 2.3 abstract from the viability of Socrates' fundamental principle and instead focus on the fit between the institutional arrangement Socrates proposes (i. e. the community of women, children, and property) and his hypothesis (i. e. that it is best that the city be as unified as possible). Once again, Aristotle rather clearly is applying the standard of institutional fit in Politics 2.3, even though he does not explicitly articulate that criterion until Politics 2.9.21
Although Politics 2.4 takes up a number of independent criticisms of the Socratic proposal, a central passage picks up on the language of the enumeration of problems at 2.2.1261a10-16. Several lines into Politics 2.4, Aristotle writes:
In general, the results of such a law are necessarily the opposite of what a correctly enacted law (tous orthôs keimenous nomous [1262b5]) should bring about, and the opposite of the reason why (di' hên aitian) Socrates thinks it necessary to organize the affairs of children and women in this way. For we regard friendship as the greatest of goods for city-states, since in this condition people are least likely to factionalize. And Socrates himself particularly praises unity in a city-state, something that is held to be, and that he himself says is, the result of friendship […] . But in a city-state this sort of community inevitably makes friendship watery, in that father hardly ever says "mine" of son or son of father. (2.4.1262b3-10, 14-17) To say that the results of Socrates' law are the opposite of the "reason why" -or cause (aitia) -of his legislation is to reiterate the criticism based on the internal 21 Mayhew 1997 characterizes this criterion as being concerned with the "means" of Socrates' proposal (in contrast to Politics 2.2, which on his account is concerned with "ends" [59, 95] ). At least based on the index locorum in his book, he is unaware of (or at least does not cite) the articulation of the internal criterion at 2.9.1269a32-34.
criterion. Yet Aristotle's criticisms go beyond pointing out lack of fit between a law and the reason or telos for its enactment. Aristotle's mention of "correctly enacted law" (1262b5) and "the greatest goods for city-states" (1262b7-8) invoke his external criterion, viz. how Socrates' proposal looks in comparison with the best organization of a constitution. The best organization inculcates friendship between citizens to thwart faction and facilitate their well-being, and Aristotle's claim is that by that standard, Socrates' proposal of a community of women, children, and property is seriously deficient.
Before turning to Aristotle's criticisms of Sparta, let me summarize the four criticisms I have isolated in his critique of the Republic and their relationship to the four criteria I have identified. First, with respect to the hypothesis criterion: Politics 2.2 shows that Socrates is wrong to take as his fundamental principle that it is best for a city to be as unified as possible as such unity undermines the self-sufficiency of a city. Second, with respect to the internal criterion: Politics 2.3 shows that Socrates' proposal that all say "mine" about the same things brings about the opposite of his goal of unity as it actually creates disagreement and dissention between people. Third, with respect to the external criterion: Politics 2.4 shows that Socrates' community of women and children undermines friendship, which is one of the greatest goods in the best constitution. Fourth, with respect to the actual practices criterion: Politics 2.5 shows that Socrates' innovative proposal for communal ownership of property is inferior to the actual practice of private ownership mixed with communal use as communal ownership undermines care of property, something not found in constitutions which actually mix private ownership with communal use. Can one find the same patterns of argument in Aristotle's treatment of Sparta?
Criteria in the Critique of Sparta (Politics 2.9)
Although the chapter divisions of Aristotle's critique of the Republic map rather nicely on to the various criteria I have articulated, his chapter-length critique of Sparta is shorter and not subdivided into chapters. Nonetheless, the chapter as a whole is clearly organized in accord with the criteria which Aristotle initially identifies at the outset of Politics 2.9 and which I have argued are equally applicable to the Republic.22 After explicitly articulating the external and internal crite-22 De Laix 1974, 21 f., takes the external criterion to refer to how Aristotle thought the Spartan constitution was originally established under its legendary lawgiver Lycurgus and the internal ria, 2.9 considers criticisms based on the external criterion (the problem of procuring leisure [1269a34-b12]), those based on the internal criterion (the bulk of the critique, which examines Spartan social and political arrangements [1269b12-1271a41]), and finally critiques based on the hypothesis criterion (the critique of Sparta's view of the goal of the polis and its relationship to goods [1271a41-b10]).23 As Aristotle's examination of the Spartan constitution is grounded in a comparison with the actual constitutions of Crete and Carthage, many of his criticisms also have their basis in the actual practice criterion.
Aristotle begins with a critique of Sparta's Helot policy. But the reason for examining its subject population is telling. Aristotle writes that "It is generally agreed that to be governed finely a constitution should have leisure from necessary tasks. But the way to achieve this is not easy to discover" (2.9.1269a34-36). As Aristotle makes clear in his own examination of the best constitution in Politics 7-8, providing leisure to its citizens is a crucial prerequisite for any candidate for the best constitution and it is fair game to judge a constitution in accord with the external criterion by examining whether it provides leisure to its citizens. Judged from the perspective of the best constitution -what I have called the external standard -the Spartan constitution fails to provide requisite leisure as it endures in constant threat of revolt by its subject population.24 Sparta's arrangement with criterion to refer to how he thought Sparta was organized in the 4 th century BCE, after it had departed from its original, ideal constitution (cf. Xenophon, Lac. Const. 14). But Schütrumpf 1994, 332-336, persuasively shows that on the question of Sparta Aristotle is decidedly not a "developmentalist"; the problems Aristotle identifies in the Sparta of his time cannot be separated from the mistakes of the original Lycurgean constitution. 23 Whereas the critique of the Republic applied first the fundamental principle criterion (Pol 2.2), then the internal criterion (Pol 2.3), the external criterion (Pol 2.4), and finally the actual practice criterion (Pol 2.5), within the chapter on Sparta Aristotle starts with the external criterion, spends most of his time focusing on applications of the internal criterion, and then briefly addresses the fundamental value criterion; the actual practice criterion is invoked throughout, with numerous comparisons between actual practices in Sparta, Crete, and Carthage. 24 I take it that in his discussion of Sparta's Helot problem, Aristotle is pointing out a deficiency with Spartan institutions "as compared with the best organization"; but Saunders 1995, 150, sees here something "contrary to the fundamental principle"; he writes that, "in so far as Sparta aims at the 'assumption' of freedom from essential tasks [i. e., leisure], she is correct; but partly for accidental reasons (foreign relations), and partly because of bad management, she has a 'way' of achieving it that is contrary to it; for the Spartans purchase that freedom at the paradoxical cost of constant worry about insurrection." Saunders 1995 seems mistaken for a number of reasons. First, it is false to say that the Spartan assumption is "freedom from essential tasks". Secondly, it seems odd that Aristotle would drop his first criterion for evaluating constitutions immediately after having articulated it. Finally, the language Aristotle uses to identify Sparta's labor policy its Helot population is deficient in comparison to the metic population which Aristotle proposes in his own best constitution (7.9.1328b33-1329a2).25
The majority of Politics 2.9 takes up criticisms of Sparta based on the internal criterion or the consistency between its institutions and its hypothesis. Criticisms based on the internal criterion fall into two groups: Aristotle first considers the social institutions of Sparta (specifically, its legislation concerning women, the distribution of property, and the production of children) and then its political institutions (specifically, the organization of its various offices such as the Ephorate, the Gerousia, and its public messes). In both cases, Aristotle is focused upon Spartan institutions which are in conflict with its hypothesis that martial virtue and domination are the highest goals.26
The critique of social institutions focuses upon the license (anesis) of Spartan women and the predicament of oliganthrôpia, or shortage of men, which arises out of a combination of policies concerning Spartan marriages, female ownership of property, and the promotion of child bearing.27 In the case of the former problem, Aristotle claims that female licentiousness is detrimental to the "deliberate choice of the constitution" (tên proairesin tês politeias) as "the lawgiver,28 wishing the whole city-state to have endurance (karterikên), makes his wish evident where the men are concerned, but has been negligent in the case of (dei tê(i) 
mellousê(i) kalôs politeuesthai tên tôn anagkaiôn huparchein scholên [1269a34-35]) echoes that of the external criterion (ei ti kalôs ê mê kalôs pros tên aristên nenomothetêtai taxin [1269b31-32]).
25 As Simpson 1998, 113 n. 83, notes, "The solution Aristotle himself proposes later is to import slaves from abroad who are lacking in spirit (4(7).10.1330a25-28). Their coming from abroad would make them less ready to revolt, as they would not have the belief that the land was really theirs; and their lacking spirit would make them natural slaves." 26 Aristotle also criticizes Spartan gymnastic and musical education on the basis of the internal criterion; see 8.4.1338b29-38, 8.5.1339a39-39b4. 27 The historical accuracy of Aristotle's remarks about Spartan women is a source of disagreement. Plutarch, writing in the first century C.E., already contested the accuracy of Aristotle's remarks about the education of Spartan women (Lycur. 26.2 f.). Cartledge 1981 vouches for Aristotle's accuracy whereas Pomeroy 2002 claims unavoidable bias. Ducat 2006, 223-248 , surveys the conflicting testimony. 28 In Politics 2.9, Aristotle makes reference both to the name of Lycurgus, the apocryphal founder of the Spartan constitution, and the term "lawgiver". For the use of the name "Lycurgus", which is found usually outside Politics 2.9, see: 2.9.1270a7, 2.10.1271b25, 2.12.1273b33, 2.12.1274a29, 4.11.1296a20; for the use of the term "lawgiver", which is ubiquitous inside 2.9, see: 2.9.1269b20, 1270a4, 1270b1, b19, 1271a13, a22, a41, 1271b15). De Laix 1974, 27 f., suggests that Aristotle uses the name of Lycurgus when he praises Sparta and "the lawgiver" when he criticizes him.
women.29 For being free from all constraint, they live in total intemperance and luxury" (2.9.1269b19-23). Lycurgus' intention or the hypothesis of the Spartan constitution elevates a certain virile strength or military virtue above all other virtues, as such excellence makes domination possible.30 Female licentiousness undermines or is at odds with such a hypothesis in at least two ways. First, licentiousness inculcates intemperance and luxury in Spartan women, which in turn infects Spartan men with esteem for wealth or love of money (1269b24; cf, 127014-15, 1271a18).31 Second, the sexual obsession which warlike Spartan men have -as the pairing of Aphrodite and Ares in myth reminds us (1269b28-29) -empowers Spartan women to rule Sparta as gunaikokratoumenoi (1269b24-25).32 Aristotle notes:
What difference is there between women rulers and rulers ruled by women? The result is the same. Audacity (thrasutêtos) is not useful in everyday matters, but only, if at all, in war. Yet Spartan women were very harmful even here. They showed this quite clearly during the Theban invasions [in 369]. (2.9.1269b32-36).
Although Aristotle's remarks are chauvinistic, contra Pomeroy, his criticism is ultimately not based on sexist or patriarchal presuppositions.33 Rather, his claim is that the Spartan constitution was organized around the goal of domination, and the Spartan neglect of the education and habituation of its women resulted in the formation of social problems which were in conflict with the Spartan goal or hypothesis. Aristotle may indeed have thought that the autonomy of Spartan 29 Note that by the adjective "endurance" (karterikê), Aristotle means physical strength or strength of purpose rather than constitutional stability. Aristotle identifies karteria, the noun from whence the adjective is derived, as a human virtue rather like courage (7.15.1334a22). 30 See 2.9.1271b1-7; cf. Plutarch, Lycur. 22.2 and Xenophon, Lac. Const. 14.1-7. 31 Hodkinson 1994 surveys classical attitudes towards Spartan views about wealth and groups Plato and Aristotle together as critics who claim that Sparta's covert love of money was deeply rooted in Lycurgean or traditional Spartan institutions -such as the neglect of women -rather than the result of the imperial excesses following the Peloponnesian wars (201-207). Schütrumpf 1994 concurs, arguing against those who see Aristotle distinguishing between praiseworthy aspects of Sparta "in the good old days" and its blameworthy aspects after its 4 th century decline. 32 Bradford 1986 provides testimony concerning Spartan women that support Aristotle's claims. He concludes that "We -in the light of modern feminism -might not agree that Spartan women ruled Spartan men, but we must concede to Aristotle that some Spartan women did have real power in the Spartan state" (18). 33 Pomeroy 2002, 151 , when considering the validity of using Aristotle as a source to understand Sparta, writes that he thought household "hierarchy existed by nature and any perversion of it was monstrous. That Spartan women enjoyed authority in the oikos and owned and managed property appears to him outrageous." women was "outrageous" (to use Pomeroy's word); but that is not the point of his criticism.
The second social problem which Aristotle analyses -that of oliganthrôpia, or the dramatic shortage of Spartiates eligible to serve in its army -is complicated in historical detail, although the structure of his argument is clearly based upon the internal criterion. Aristotle claims that the confluence of several decisions by the Spartan lawgiver -that he made property transferable by gift or bequest, that he allowed women control over large dowries, that he set up enticements for families to produce as many children as possible (thus diminishing the inheritance of each child), and that there was a property requirement to participate fully as a Spartiate -resulted in the consolidation of wealth, the disenfranchisement of poor Spartan males, and a radical decrease in the number of men eligible to serve in the Spartan army (a decline, Aristotle reports, from as many as 10,000 Spartiates in the 5 th century to fewer than 1,000 at the time of the battle of Leuctra [in 371]).34 No matter how complex the underlying social mechanism is which produced Sparta's decline in manpower, there can be no doubt that such a decline is deeply at odds with the hypothesis of a society that embraces militarianism and expansionism. 35 After identifying Spartan social institutions which conflict with the Spartan hypothesis, Aristotle next turns to Spartan political institutions -namely, the structure of its various offices -which are at odds with its hypothesis or the lawgiver's "deliberately chosen aim" (2.9.1271a32). Aristotle's criticisms are complicated for two reasons: First, although Sparta wrongly makes martial virtue supreme, its emphasis on virtue is nonetheless aristocratic.36 Thus, offices which are oligarchic or democratic are inconsistent with its aristocratic hypothesis. Second, we know from elsewhere in the Politics that Aristotle considers Sparta a model of a mixed constitution, namely one which mixes aristocratic, monarchic, oligarchic, and democratic elements together to produce institutional stability.37 Although Aristotle praises the mixed nature of the Spartan constitution elsewhere, in Politics 2.9 he presents departures from the aristocratic principle as deficiencies in the Spartan constitution rather than strengths. What Aristotle 34 See 2.9.1270a13-1270b6. Hodkinson 1988 discusses what we know about the social problems Aristotle analyzes; Cawkwell 1983 scrutinizes the numerical decline of Spartiates. 35 Such economic stratification conflicts with Lycurgus' egalitarian aims, best exemplified in his institution of the common messes (the phiditia), which I discuss below. 36 See 4.7.1293b7-21, 5.7.1306b29-1307a5. 37 See 2.6.1265b33-41, 4.9.1294b13-38. In Lockwood 2006 I explore Aristotle's account of how a mixed constitution promotes institutional stability regardless of whether the constitution is superlatively good. seems to have in mind is similar to an observation he makes about Plato's Laws: if the standard for judging the constitution is what is most acceptable for other cities, then the constitution of the Laws is a good one; but if it is taken to be a candidate for the best constitution, then it is not good (2.6.1265b28-33). When Aristotle praises Sparta as possessing a mixed constitution, he is doing so according to the standard of what institutional arrangements are generally accessible for all constitutions (a point to which I will turn in the last part of my paper). But in Politics 2, the standard is not what is most generally accessible but what is best without qualification. Judged on that basis, democratic or oligarchic elements in Sparta's constitution are deficiencies rather than points of strength.
Thus, in the remainder of the section, Aristotle highlights aspects of the ephoreia (or "overseers"), the gerousia (or "senate"), and the phiditia (or "public messes" -what Aristotle usually refers to as the sussitia) which are at odds with Spartan aristocracy or the lawgiver's intent. In the case of the overseers -a board of five officials elected annually from the whole body of the Spartiate who possessed strong executive, disciplinary, and legal powers38 -Aristotle is quite explicit in his invocation of the internal criterion: as that office was open to all people, including the poor, this "harms the constitution, for from an aristocracy a democracy was emerging" (1270b15-17); it also puts ordinary people in authority over the most important judicial decisions (1270b28-31). Aristotle also points out that the lifestyle of the overseers is at odds with the "aim of the constitution" (tôi boulêmati tês politeias [2.9.1270b31]). No doubt, tyrannical power (to which Aristotle explicitly likens their authority [1270b13]) was inconsistent with the austere lifestyle demanded by the Spartan elevation of martial virtue.39 But a glance at Xenophon's Lacedaemonian Constitution shows the lack of fit between how the Ephorate worked in practice and the aim of the constitution. Xenophon notes that Lycurgus gave the Ephorate great power because obedience (to peithesthai) is a great good in the city, army, and household, and "they thought that the greater the power of these magistrates, the more they would impress the minds of the citizens".40 But in practice, Ephorate lifestyle, which Aristotle claims was lax and covertly hedonistic (1270b32, 35), was the opposite of austerity and inconsistent with the lawgiver's intent.
38 Cartledge 2000 and Andrewes 1966 provide background on the political offices examined in this and the next paragraph. 39 Simpson 1998, 117 , notes that the ephors "are clearly in a position to do just about whatever they want, but only as ephors. As citizens they are subject to all the harsh rigors that every other Spartan is subject to. The resulting tension between the two conditions would evidently be a severe trial even for good men, let alone for the rather base sorts who become ephors." 40 Xenophon, Lac. Const. 8.3. In the case of the senate -a body of 28 elders elected from the Spartiate on the basis of personal merit who exercised judicial power in capital and other serious cases -Aristotle doubts that its members possess the virtue requisite for the office as their training has been in martial rather than deliberative or practical virtue (2.9.1270b36-71a2). But Aristotle's main criticism of the senate concerns their election and the tendencies it encourages amongst aged Spartans. According to Plutarch's Life of Lycurgus, members of the senate were elected by a process of acclamation: an assembly was convened and individuals stationed in a nearby room -incapable of seeing or being seen by the assembly -would tally who received the loudest cheers from the assembly, not knowing who was being evaluated by which cheers but only the order of cheers.41 In general, Aristotle finds the process rather childish (paidariôdês [1271a10; cf. 1270b28]). But more troubling is the underlying mechanism behind the form of election. Aristotle writes that the lawgiver […] is evidently doing the same thing here as in the rest of the constitution. He makes the citizens love honor and then takes advantage of that fact in the election of senators; for no one would ask for office who did not love honor (mê philotimos). Yet the love of honor (philotimia) and of money (philochrêmatia) are the causes of most voluntary wrongdoings among human beings. (2.9.1271a13-18) Aristotle has already pointed out that bribe-taking and favoritism were conspicuous amongst senators (1271a3-5), so clearly the institutional arrangement which the lawgiver crafted is not working. But reminiscent of Socrates' critique of timocracy in the Republic (see, for instance, 548c), love of honor here is a source of injustice, not one of virtue or the public good. The lawgiver's intent was to establish a contest or agôn of sorts in which individuals would compete for the recognition and esteem of their peers.42 Aristotle's take on such a contest is that "it is wrong for someone worthy of the office to ask for it: a man worthy of the office should hold it whether he wants it or not" (1271a11-12). Sparta may be aristocratic 41 Plutarch, Life of Lycurgus, 26.2-3. Schwartzberg 2010 considers classical mechanisms of acclamation within the framework of contemporary democratic theory. 42 Xenophon's account of the process is much more sympathetic to the lawgiver. He writes "The law by which Lycurgus encouraged the practice of virtue up to old age is another excellent measure in my opinion. By requiring men to face the ordeal of election to the Council of Elders near the end of life, he prevented neglect of high principles (kalokagathia) even in old age […] . And surely it is natural that of all the contests (agôn) in the world this should have excited the greatest zeal. For noble as are the contests in the Games, they are merely tests of bodily power. But the contest for the senate judges souls whether they be good" (Lac. Const. X.1, 3). in its virtuous aspirations; but the appeal to competitive honor does not thwart injustice. Rather, from Aristotle's perspective, it is its cause.
Aristotle's criticism of the Spartan "public messes" incorporate criticisms based on both the actual practice and the internal criterion. In the case of the former, it is important to remember, as Rubin (2012) underscores, that the examination of the constitutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage is a comparative study of actual practices (2.11.1272b24-28). Throughout Politics 2.9-11, Aristotle compares and contrasts the various institutional arrangements of the three different cities, applying over and over again what I have called the "actual practice" criterion. The comparative constitutional evaluation found in this section is essentially an exercise in holding the institutions of one polis constitution up against the actual practice of those to which it is similar. Thus, in Politics 2.9 Aristotle explicitly notes the superiority of the public messes in Crete, which are publicly supported, rather than derived solely from private individuals (2.9.1271b28-29). But if we view section 2.9-11 as a whole, we see that Aristotle invokes the "actual practice" criterion not only in the contrast between the public messes of Sparta and Crete, but also in the comparisons between Spartan and Carthaginian political institutions.43
With respect to the internal criterion, Aristotle also states explicitly that the way the Spartan messes are organized results in the "opposite of the lawgiver's deliberately chosen aim" (tounantion tô(i) nomothetê(i) tês proaireseôs [1271a31-32]). The Spartan lawgiver sought to make the messes egalitarian (or in Aris totle's anachronism, "democratic" [1271b32-34]) communal opportunities for individuals to share their knowledge and build community bonds -one in which, according to Plutarch, wealth was blind "for the rich man could never use nor enjoy nor even see or display his abundant means, when he went to the same meal as the poor man" (Lycur. 10.3; cf. Lac. Const. V.2, 5-6). But as the Spartan constitution required each individual to contribute a fixed amount per capita as a property requirement for sharing in the messes and the constitution more generally, the messes excluded the poor (2.10.1272a13-14; 2.9.1271a26-37). Better, claims Aristotle, is the Cretan arrangement of messes, which provide food from communally held crops, thus allowing all men, children, and women to be fed at public 43 Aristotle's explicit comparisons between Sparta, Carthage, and Crete include discussions of public messes (2.10.1272a12-27), the Ephorate (2.10.1272a27-31, 2.11.1272b33-1273a1), the Gerousia (2.10.1272a35-38), kingship (2.11.1273a18-20), the problem of dependent populations (2.9.1269a38-b5, 2.10.1271b40-41). In Lockwood 2015, 75-78, I argue that Aristotle evaluates the constitution of Carthage, a non-Greek, Phoenician polis located in Northern Africa, as superior to the constitutions of the Greek cities of Crete and Sparta. See also Pangle 2013, 93-97. expense.44 Aristotle's critique of the messes is thus two-fold: their exclusion of the poor is the opposite of the lawgiver's intent (an internal critique) and their property organization is inferior to that of Crete (an actual practice critique).
After having criticized the social and political institutions of Sparta based on the internal and actual practices criteria, Aristotle turns in the closing lines of the chapter on Sparta to a brief consideration of its hypothesis or fundamental principle.45 Echoing Plato's Laws (625c-638b), Aristotle criticizes the fundamental aim of Sparta's lawgiver, which is domination (kratein). Although his laws rightly aim at virtue, it is only a part of virtue, namely martial virtue; although Spartans think that virtue is the path to good things, they mistakenly suppose that conquest is better than virtue itself (2.9.1271b2-3, 6-10). As Simpson notes, the chapter comes full circle: Politics 2.9 began by pointing out the problems Sparta faced in establishing leisure (namely, those occasioned by its Helot problem) and it concludes by noting that because of the erroneous orientation of Spartan education, its citizens did not know how to be at leisure (1271b3-5).46 In Politics 7.14 Aristotle elaborates the point with a metaphor:
For most city-states of the sort described [e. g., Sparta and Crete] remain secure while they are at war, but come to ruin once they have acquired an empire. Like an iron sword, they lose their edge when they remain at peace. But the one responsible is their lawgiver, who did not educate them to be able to be at leisure. (7.14.1334a6-10) In the sequel of Politics 8, Aristotle will go so far as to say that the Spartan form of education produces citizens who are truly vulgar (banausoi), for it makes "them 44 See 2.10.1272a15-21; cf. Aristotle's own solution to the arrangement in 2. 5.1263a35-39, 7.10.1330a2-24. 45 The penultimate 8 lines of Politics 2.9, which criticize Spartan "public finances" (peri ta koina chrêmata [1271b10-11]) do not fit easily into the structure I have articulated for the chapter and its progression through criticisms based on the four criteria I have outlined. Aristotle claims that Sparta is in a bind because they "are compelled to fight major wars, yet the public treasury is empty and taxes are not properly paid […] . Thus the result that the lawgiver has produced is the opposite of beneficial: he has made his city poor and the private individuals into lovers of money" (1271b12-13, 15-17). The criticism seems to combine arguments based on the external principle (public finance is contrary to what it should be in the best constitution), Sparta's hypothesis (public finances fuel a need for conquest), and the internal principle (Spartan institutions have brought about the opposite of what the lawgiver intended). 46 Simpson 1998, 120 , further speculates whether these two claims may be related: "The error about slavery might well have been instrumental in causing their other error about the supposition of the constitution, since it would necessarily force them to prize military dominance as the only key to survival." I take Simpson to mean by "survival" mitigation of the threat of uprisings by its subject populations rather than mitigating internal strife. useful to statesmen for one task only, and one at which they are worse than other people" (8.4.1338b33-36) . Not only does Sparta produce men suited for little more than cannon fodder, they are only mediocre at that task.
Aristotle's criticism of the Spartan hypothesis in Politics 2.9 is far less elaborate than the criticisms he makes to show that Socrates' hypothesis is incorrect. In part, the difference is the result of textual organization. In the last two books of the Politics, Aristotle criticizes the Spartan hypothesis on the grounds that it views war as an end rather than as the means to peace.47 The Spartan hypothesis of domination and its concomitant elevation of only martial virtue are problematic especially in the light of Aristotle's best constitution and it is in the analysis of the best constitution that Aristotle fully explains the faulty nature of the Spartan hypothesis -how that hypothesis disorients Spartan education and its application stunts Spartans and makes them incapable of using leisure.48 That Aristotle's articulation of his own best constitution uses the Spartan constitution, an existing constitution, as a foil underscores the permeability of the division between "theoretical" and "practical" best constitutions.
Conclusion: Superlative and Non-superlative Criteria in the Politics
Aristotle examines constitutions thought to be well-governed in Politics 2 to see what is correct or useful in them so that he may apply their insights to the study of that political community which is "best of all for people who are most able to live in accord with one's prayers" (2.1.1260b27-33). As I have shown at length in my paper, Aristotle's four criteria -actual practice, internal criterion, external criterion, and fundamental value criterion -permeate and structure his evaluation of those constitutions throughout Politics 2. By contrast, Politics 2 takes up the question of political stability far less frequently, which outside Politics 2 and 47 See 7.2.1324b3-12, 7.14.1333b6-34a10. 48 Lockwood forthcoming examines Aristotle's criticism of Sparta's hypothesis and the educational system oriented towards its goal. The critique, spread over Politics 7. 2, 7.14, 7.15, 8.4, and 8.5 , applies the fundamental value criterion (in its critique of the hypothesis of domination), the actual practice criterion (in that it compares Spartan and Theban physical education), the internal criterion (in that it claims Spartan education produces soldiers with defective courage), and the external criterion (in that Sparta serves as a foil for Aristotle's own account of paideia).
7-8 is a major goal for the political scientist.49 As Kahn 1990 notes, Aristotle's Politics as a whole is pulled in (at least) two different normative directions: in some places, it identifies the happiness, virtue, and well-functioning of a constitution's citizens as the lawgiver's main objective, but in others, it identifies as the legislator's objective stability and mitigation of faction. The criteria I have examined in Politics 2 for the most part pick out those constitutions which excel at the first objective, but elsewhere in the Politics Aristotle is well aware of additional criteria -for instance, that the majority of those in a polis support its constitution, regardless of whether that constitution is correct or deviant50 -that pick out constitutions which excel at the second objective. Politics 7-8 shares the same orientation as Politics 2: it offers very little discussion of the stability of the best regime and instead is oriented by the same internal, external, and fundamental value criteria articulated in Pol 2.51 As Aristotle notes in his account of the best constitution:
Well-being consists in two things: setting up the aim (skopon) and the end (telos) of action correctly and discovering the actions that bear on it. Those factors can be in harmony with one another or in disharmony. For people sometimes set up the end well but fail to achieve it in action; and sometimes they achieve everything that promotes the end, but the end they set up is a bad one. Sometimes they make both mistakes. (7.13.1331b26-34)52
Aristotle's articulation of what makes a constitution well-organized draws upon precisely the same criteria that he has used in Politics 2. From a normative perspective, Politics 2 and 7-8 are drawn from the same cloth.
49 Müller 2016, 12 f., notes that Aristotle raises the issue of stability in his comments on Phaleas' and Hippodamus' proposals to eliminate faction (2.7.1267a37-38, 2.8.1268a14-29), in his discussion of Sparta's mixed constitution (2.9.1270b21-26), and in his observations that the Carthaginian constitution is free of faction (2.11.1272b29-33, 1273b18) and the Cretan constitution plagued by dynastic instability (2.10.1272b7-15). By contrast, Garver 2011 argues that Politics 2 as a whole is silent on the nature of that which is just (to dikaion), a topic which is central to many of the discussions in Books 3-6 of the Politics. He writes that "After Book II, the main sources of unity and conflict in the polis are in agreements and disputes about justice. Not only is there no justice in Book II, but there is no talk about justice, either, and no talk at all" (65). 50 2.9.1270b21-26, 4.12.1296b14-16, 5.9.1309b16-18. 51 Outside Politics 7-8, Aristotle emphasizes "education in a constitution" as a fundamental means of promoting constitutional stability (2.9.1263b35, 5.9.1310a ff.). Although Pol 8.1 notes that education in a constitution safeguards that constitution (1337a14-15), education in the best constitution is primarily directed towards excellence rather than constitutional stability. 52 Politics 7 also has extended discussion of the fundamental value criterion, which, as noted in section 3, takes place in juxtaposition with his extended critique of the Spartan hypothesis (7.2.1324b3-12, 7.14.1333b6-34a10) By contrast, Aristotle's discussions of stability as an objective in Politics 2 downplays its relevance. For instance, Aristotle acknowledges that Phaleas sought to equalize all property holdings in his constitution on the grounds that inequality is the main source of faction in the polis.53 But Aristotle's critique of Phaleas' constitution is primarily an application of the internal criterion: he notes that equalizing property is (in his words) "no big thing" (ou mên mega ouden [2.7.1267a39]); far more important for the best regime is the proper education of desires more generally (2.7.1266b29-31, 1267b5-9). Although Aristotle's discussion of Phaleas' constitution certainly raises the problem of how the best constitution should deal with the issue of faction, his dismissal of Phaleas' proposals suggests that avoiding faction or seeking constitutional stability is not the main objective of the best constitution.
Aristotle also seems to suggest that the criterion of constitutional stability picks out a different constitution as praiseworthy than the constitution which the criteria of Politics 2 pick out. Aristotle's discussion of the constitution in Plato's Laws (a mixed constitution, like that in Sparta) elucidates what is at issue. When Aristotle discusses Plato's Laws he posits two different standpoints for judging the constitution:
If, of the various constitutions, [Plato] is establishing this one as the one generally most acceptable (koinotatên) to cities, his proposal is perhaps fine, but if as next best after the first constitution, it is not fine. For one might well commend the Spartan constitution or some other more aristocratic one. (2.6.1265b29-33)54
Aristotle evaluates constitutions from numerous perspectives in the Politics. Judged from the perspective of which constitution offers reforms that can be incorporated into the greatest number of other constitutions, the constitution of the Laws is praiseworthy. But judged from the perspective of which constitution is superlatively good, the constitution of the Laws is not praiseworthy (or at the least it is inferior to other candidates).
Aristotle's discussion of the stability of the Spartan constitution presents a similar evaluative dilemma. Aristotle is clear both inside Politics 2.9 and elsewhere in the Politics that the Spartan constitution possessed unusual stability which in 53 Pol 2.7.1266a38-39; cf. 2.7.1266b38, 2.7.1267a37-39. On Phaleas' proposed constitution more generally, see Balot 2001 . 54 Aristotle notes that the Laws is understood by Plato to be the most "commonly accessible one" (2.6.1265a3; cf. Laws 739a, 745e, 805b-d, 853c). For Aristotle's own articulation of the "most commonly accessible" constitution, see 4.1.1288b38, 4.11.1295a31-1296b12. part was the result of its mixed nature.55 From the perspective of the superlatively good constitution (namely, based upon the criteria I have explored in my paper), opening the office of the Ephorate to anyone is a mistake, as it incorporates democratic elements into an aristocracy and makes the office accessible to the poor who are susceptible to bribes (1270b8-10). But from the perspective of the most stable constitution, such inclusiveness is quite praiseworthy. And thus, after criti cizing the democratic aspects of the Ephorate, Aristotle almost immediately concedes that opening the office to all promotes the stability of the Spartan constitution "for the dêmos remain contented because they share in the most important office" (1270b17-19). Such stability derives from the principle that "for a constitution to survive, every part of the polis must want it to exist and to remain as it is" (1270b21-22; cf. 5.9.1309b13-17). From a prudential perspective, no constitution can endure which is despised by the majority of its citizens. But that criterion appears less relevant to the evaluation of well-governed or superlative constitutions; at the least, its articulation in Politics 2.9 is a rare exception to the numerous applications of the evaluative principles I have documented in sections 2 and 3 of my paper. Indeed, Aristotle notes that majority support is insufficient to establish praise for a constitution "since that could happen in a bad constitution too" (4.9.1294b37-38). The criterion of constitutional stability is ultimately of lesser significance for evaluating the best constitutions of Politics 2 than the criteria I have analyzed in this paper (although it is a major concern outside of Politics 2).
Politics 2 and Politics 7-8 share what one might call "ideal" criteria (namely, those I have documented in part 1 of my paper), but downplay criteria for nonideal states, such as constitutional stability or the mitigation of faction. Thus the paradox of my introduction. Aristotle's use of evaluative criteria in Politics 2, on the one hand, lessens the gap between what exists in practice and what is merely proposed or "theoretical". As Plato's Republic and the Spartan constitution are judged by the same standards, their modes of existing are irrelevant from the perspective of evaluating their contributions to the articulation of the best constitution. For Aristotle there is no "double standard" between actual and proposed constitutions: insofar as a constitution aims at being judged best, according to Politics 2, it should be evaluated by the same criteria whether it is existing or theoretical.56 55 See 2.6.1265b33-40, 4.9.1294b19-38. Aristotle tells the charming story of the Spartan king Theopompus (c. 770-720 BCE), who established the office of Ephors as a check upon the kingship. When asked by his wife whether he should be ashamed for handing down to his sons a lesser kingship, Aristotle reports him as replying (with Laconic brevity) "Certainly not, for I hand over the longer lasting one (ou dêta, paradidômi gar poluchroniôteran)" (5.11.1313a25-33). 56 Thus, I am in disagreement with Rubin 2012, which claims that "that best constitution for real lawgivers in real cities is not the one 'according to our prayers impeded by no external thing' but On the other hand, the distinction between ideal and non-ideal criteria broadens the gap between superlative and non-ideal constitutions. In very general terms, whereas the former aim at citizen happiness and well-being, the latter aim at constitutional stability. No doubt, the distinction is not mutually exclusive: presumably constitutional stability contributes to citizen happiness. Yet at constitutional "extremes", happiness and stability diverge. In Aristotle's analysis of superlative constitutions, he rarely invokes stability and much more frequently applies the criteria I have documented in this paper. Consider, by contrast, Aristotle's account of the preservation of tyranny. As Bodéüs 1999 notes, Aristotle paradoxically recommends to the tyrant who wishes to preserve his rule institutional reforms which aim at enabling the tyrant to "play the role nobly of a king" (5.11.1314a39-40). Although Aristotle repeatedly recommends that the tyrant take on the appearance of fiduciary, military, and ethical virtue (5.11.1314b1, 22-23, a32-36) , Aristotle is clear both that the tyrant must safeguard his power (which is in fact the hypothesis or fundamental principle of tyranny [1314a35-36] ) and that his recommendations are meant to make a tyranny more long lasting (1315b8). There is no question of evaluating what preserves a tyranny from the perspective of ideal criteria and Aristotle suspends judgment about the wrongness of the tyrant's hypothesis or the distance between it and the external criterion. The tyrant preserves common funds to justify paternalism (1314b6-7), develops military virtue to strike awe in his subjects (1315a20), and becomes more moderate with respect to bodily pleasures so as to avoid assassinations or overthrows while drunk or hung over (1314b34-36).
Although it goes beyond my paper to enter into an extended examination of the role of a criterion such as constitutional stability in the Politics, it remains striking that Aristotle criticizes those aspects of the Spartan constitution which promote its stability because they are at odds with its aristocratic hypothesis. Such criticisms suggest that the aims of being a superlative and a stable constitution are in fact distinct and provide different frameworks for evaluating one and the same constitution.57 And yet insofar as Politics 2 separates ideal and nonideal criteria, it undermines the claim that the best constitution can serve as a rather the polity of the middling element" (26). I think it is ultimately incorrect to view "real constitutions" as an alternative to the city "in accord with our prayers", at least from the perspective of normative evaluation. 57 A point which arguably is implied in Aristotle's program for political science in Politics 4.1, which separates the question of how to organize the best constitution in accord with one's prayers from questions such as institutional stability or how to organize constitutions more generally.
regulative ideal which other constitutions should aim to approximate. 58 To ask what guidance the best constitution offers to non-ideal constitutions is to make a category mistake, like asking what an obese middle-aged person can learn about exercise from the regimen of an Olympic athlete (Pol 4.1). Aristotle's use of evaluative criteria in Politics 2 diminishes the normative differences between existing and proposed constitutions; indirectly, it also suggests that one should read the best constitution of Politics 2 and 7-8 as a practical constitution that should be judged alongside other superlative constitutions rather than as a goal at which all other constitutions should aim.59 
